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Introduction 
In CILFIT (case 283/81),1 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) endorsed the use of the acte 
clair doctrine – the notion that national courts of “last resort” may decide to refrain from 
seeking a preliminary ruling under Article 234 (3) EC. The Court also stipulated a list of 
factors – the CILFIT criteria – that should be satisfied before the doctrine may be properly 
invoked. One criterion is that the national court “must be convinced that the matter is equally 
obvious to the courts of the other Member States” (emphasis added). In 1982, there were 
nine “other” Member States; in 2008, there are 26. Another criterion requires courts to bear 
in mind that Community legislation is “drafted in several languages”. There were seven 
official languages in 1982; there are now 22 (23 if Irish is included). The CILFIT criteria were 
difficult to satisfy in 1982; they have become increasingly more difficult as EU membership 
has expanded; they are, it is submitted, practically impossible to satisfy in any meaningful 
sense in 2008. The CILFIT criteria should therefore be re-written. 
 
As EU membership has expanded (and looks set for further expansion in the not too distant 
future), various reform proposals concerning the preliminary rulings procedure have been 
formulated, the central idea being to change the “judicial architecture” to allow the ECJ to 
cope with its ever increasing workload. The most notable of these is (by default, given that it 
is the only one that has actually been implemented): the insertion of the present Article 225 
(3) EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam, conferring limited jurisdiction for dealing with preliminary 
rulings on the Court of First Instance (CFI). More specifically, the CFI is authorised to deal 
with preliminary rulings in as yet unspecified ‘specific areas’. The time has come to bring 




1. The Purpose of Article 234 EC 
At the outset, it is critically important to remember why Article 234 EC even exists. The most 
obvious answer is that its purpose is the need to secure the uniformity of the EU’s legal 
order throughout the Member States. In Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf2 (case 166/73), the ECJ 
declared that:3 
 
“Article 177 is essential for the preservation of the Community character of the 
law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all 
circumstances this law is the same in all states of the Community. Whilst it thus 
aims to avoid divergences in the interpretation of Community law which the 
national courts have to apply, it likewise tends to ensure this application by 
making available to the national judge a means of eliminating difficulties which 
may be occasioned by the requirement of giving community law its full effect 
within the framework of the judicial systems of the Member States.” 
 
                                                     
1
 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] E.C.R. 3415 
2
 [1974] ECR 33. Article 177 EEC was renumbered Article 234 EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
effective May 1999 
3
 At paragraph 2 
The Impact of EU Expansion on the Preliminary Rulings Procedure 
 
This fundamental point must be borne in mind when considering any proposals to reform the 
preliminary rulings procedure. 
 
2. The Problem: Excessive Delay 
The principal problem with the Article 234 EC procedure in 2008 is the inherent delay: the 
heavy workload of the ECJ means a reference to the Court takes, on average, 19.3 months 
(2007 statistics).4 That is actually a fairly significant reduction compared to five years ago. In 
2003, the average waiting time for preliminary rulings reached an all-time high of 25.5 
months. After years of steadily increasing waiting times up to that point, the average has 
come down in each subsequent year (23.5 months in 2004; 20.4 months in 2005 and 19.8 
months in 2006). However, this should not be taken as proof that reform options are 
unnecessary. For one thing, the pace of improvement is slowing. Between 2004 and 2005, 
the waiting time decreased by 3.1 months, but between 2005 and 2006 the drop was only 
0.6 months and from 2006 to 2007 the drop was merely 0.5 months (i.e., a fortnight). 
 
Moreover, 2007 was the first year since 2001 that the number of cases in the Court’s docket 
has shown a net increase (265 new cases were received whilst only 235 were disposed of, 
leading to a net increase of 30 cases). In every year from 2002 to 2006 inclusive, the Court 
managed to achieve a net reduction in cases, with the biggest drop in 2005 (221 new cases 
against 254 disposed of, a net reduction of 33 cases).  
 
One explanation for these trends may be that, in 2004, the Court welcomed ten new judges 
from the accession states of that year. This represented a 67% in judicial personnel at the 
Court’s disposal. Against that, the number of preliminary rulings arriving from those 
accession states has – so far – been minimal. In the years 2005 – 2007 inclusive, the ten 
2004 accession states between them contributed a mere 31 cases,5 out of a grant total of 
737 received in those four years.6 By way of contrast, Belgian courts requested 60 
preliminary rulings over the same time span. 
 
However, it would be naive to rely upon this trickle of cases from the 2004 accession states 
to continue. It is a recognised phenomenon that courts in some accession states take time to 
“find their feet”.7 UK courts requested one ruling per year from 1974 to 1976 inclusive, then 
five in 1978; Austrian courts requested two rulings in 19958 followed by six in 1996, and then 
35 in 1997. Admittedly, some states maintain a level participation rate in terms of rulings 
requested. Swedish courts requested six rulings in 2007, exactly the same number as in 
1995.9 Similarly, Hungarian courts requested two rulings in 2007, the same as in 2004. 
Nevertheless, there are signs that Polish courts, after a slow start, may be developing a 
liking for preliminary rulings. Polish courts requested one ruling in 2005, two in 2006 and 
seven last year.  
 
The likelihood is that the number of rulings coming in from courts in pre-2004 accession 
States will remain fairly constant, but that requests from the 2004 and 2007 accession 
                                                     
4
 Statistics on the workload of the ECJ are available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/index_cje.htm  
5
 Ten from Poland; nine from Hungary; six from the Czech Republic; two from Estonia; two from 
Lithuania and two from Slovakia. Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia had yet to request a single ruling 
between them by the end of 2007 
6
 Some 4% of the total. 
7
 According to Walter van Gerven, “The Role and Structure of the European Judiciary now and in the 
Future” (1996) 21 E.L. Rev. 211, at p. 211, “New accessions lead, with a likely delay of 4 to 5 years, 
to a proportionally increased number of cases, an increase which is not necessarily compensated for 
by the increase in the Court’s personnel” (emphasis added) 
8
 The year of Austrian accession 
9
 The year of Swedish accession 
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countries will rise over the next few years.10 It should be noted that the 265 new preliminary 
rulings cases received in 2007 represents an all-time high.11  
Even with the recent reduction in the waiting time, it is clearly unacceptable, for several 
reasons, to have a delay approaching 20 months. First, the case at national level is 
suspended while the ECJ is preparing its ruling – meaning that the legal dispute which led to 
the case goes unresolved during that time. Second, national courts may be put off from 
asking questions because of the delay, meaning that (potentially) a number of very important 
questions which would otherwise be answered by the ECJ have to be answered by the 
national courts. This in turn risks fostering a lack of uniformity in EU law as well as potentially 
inhibiting the development of the ECJ’s jurisprudence. It should not be forgotten that the 
ECJ’s role in the preliminary rulings procedure is essentially reactive: the Court depends on 
the national courts feeding it with questions. Although it has shown some flexibility in re-
wording questions asked of it, it nevertheless cannot answer questions which it has not been 
asked at all. Third, with the pressure of work there is a risk that the Court may be rushed.12 
 
3. The factors which have contributed to the problem 
Angus Johnston states:13 “Clearly, there is a serious workload problem for the Courts, due to 
a number of factors… it is particularly serious in the context of references for a preliminary 
ruling”. What are these factors? The following does not purport to be a definitive list, but 
indicates some of the reasons behind the Court’s increasing workload. First, the increasing 
number of Member States, meaning more referrals, and the increasing number of 
languages, which adds to the translational problems, exacerbating the problem caused 
initially by more referrals. To summarise the growth of the EU to date:  
 
o Originally, six states with a mere four languages (Dutch, French, German, 
Italian);  
o From 1973, nine states with six languages (Danish and English);  
o From 1981, ten States with seven languages (Greek);  
o From 1986, 12 States with nine languages (Portuguese and Spanish);  
o From 1995, 15 states with 11 languages (Finnish and Swedish);  
o From 2004, 25 States with 20 languages (Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, 
Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak, Slovene); and  
o From 2007, 27 States with 22 languages (Bulgarian and Romanian).  
 
In addition, primary legislation is produced in Irish. Only four of the present 27 Member 
States have no official language – Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, and Luxembourg. 
 
Second, the increasing scope and volume of EC legislation. To give just one example, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam inserted Article 13 into the EC Treaty, effective May 1999. The 
Council used this power to pass two important directives: Directive 2000/43 on racial or 
ethnic origin discrimination, and Directive 2000/78 on age, disability, religion and belief 
and sexual orientation discrimination (the framework directive). These directives have 
already generated preliminary rulings to clarify the meaning of ambiguous words such as 
‘disability’,14 ‘dismissals’,15 and ‘pay’16 and phrases such as 'facts from which it may be 
                                                     
10
 Bulgarian and Romanian courts requested one ruling each in 2007: Apis-Hristovich EOOD v 
Lakorda AD (case C-545/07) and Ministerul Administraţiei şi Internelor – Direcţia Generală de 
Paşapoarte Bucureşti v Gheorghe Jipa (case C-33/07), respectively. That figure is almost certain to 
rise over the next few years 
11
 The previous record being 264 in 1998 
12
 Anthony Arnull, “Refurbishing the Judicial Architecture of the European Community” (1994) 43 
I.C.L.Q. 296, at p.298, observed that “it can no longer be said that the Court’s judgments are 
invariably a product of mature reflection” 
13
 “Judicial Reform and the Treaty of Nice” (2001) 38 C.M.L. Rev. 499, at p.501 
14
 Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA (case C-13/05) [2006] E.C.R. I-6467 
15
 Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA (case C-411/05), judgment 16th October 2007 
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presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination',17 ‘less favourable’ 
treatment’,18 and ‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim’.19 Other 
references in the future are inevitable to establish the meaning of phrases such as: ‘racial 
or ethnic origin’; ‘religion or belief’; ‘sexual orientation’, ‘public or private organisations, the 
ethos of which is based on religion or belief’, ‘to act in good faith and with loyalty’; 
‘unwanted conduct’, ‘violating the dignity of a person’, and ‘creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’. 
 
Third, the contribution made by the ECJ. It is fair to say that the Court itself has contributed 
to its own problems. Initially, the ECJ encouraged references, through an “open door” policy. 
This can be demonstrated by reference to the very generous attitude towards the ECJ as to 
what constitutes ‘any court or tribunal’ in Article 234 (2) EC. The Court could have 
interpreted this literally, but that would have restricted thousands of judicial bodies not 
named “court” or “tribunal” from seeking rulings, which would have interposed an obstacle 
between the ECJ and the national legal systems, threatening not only the co-operation 
between them but also potentially frustrating the development of the ECJ’s jurisprudence. 
Instead, the Court interpreted the phrase ‘any court or tribunal’ purposively, looking for 
bodies exercising judicial functions irrespective of their formal designation. Probably the best 
known example is Broekmeulen (case 246/80),20 where the Court accepted a reference from 
the Appeals Committee of the Royal Netherlands Society for the Protection of Medicine. 
 
Eventually, the Court identified various criteria for establishing whether or not a body was a 
‘court or tribunal’. In Dorsch Consult (case C-54/96),21 the Court stated that “In order to 
determine whether a body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’... the Court takes into 
account a number of factors, such as: 
 • whether the body is established by law, • whether it is permanent, • whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, • whether its procedure is inter partes,  • whether it applies rules of law, and  • whether it is independent.” 
 
These criteria were applied in such a way that the court was able to accept references from, 
inter alia, the Immigration Adjudicator (UK),22 the Federal Procurement Office (Austria),23 the 
Rural Businesses Appeals Board (Finland),24 the Universities’ Appeals Board (Sweden),25 
                                                                                                                                                                     
16
 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen (case C-267/06), judgment 1st April 
2008 
17
 Centre for Equal Opportunities & Opposition to Racism v Firma Feryn (case C-54/07) (pending) 
18
 Felix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA (case C-411/05), judgment 16th October 2007 
19
 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm (case C-144/04) [2005] E.C.R. I-9981 
20
 C. Broekmeulen v Huisarts Registratie Commissie [1981] E.C.R. 2311 
21
 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH (case C-54/96) 
[1997] E.C.R. I-4961 
22
 Nour El-Yassini v Secretary of State for the Home Department (case C-416/96) [1999] E.C.R. I-
1209; Arben Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (case C-356/98) [2000] E.C.R. I-
2623 
23
 Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG & Others v Strohal Rotationsdruck GesmbH  (case C-44/96) 
[1998] E.C.R. I-73; Walter Tögel v Niederösterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse (case C-76/97) [1998] 
E.C.R. I-5357; EvoBus Austria GmbH v Niederösterreichische Verkehrsorganisations GmbH (Növog) 
(case C-111/97) [1998] E.C.R. I-5411; Alcatel Austria & Others v Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft 
und Verkehr (case C-81/98) [1999] E.C.R. I-7671; Traunfellner GmbH v Österreichische Autobahnen- 
und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag) (case C-421/01) [2003] E.C.R. I-11941 
24
 Raija-Liisa Jokela & Laura Pitkäranta (cases C-9/97 & C-118/97) [1998] E.C.R. I-6267 
25
 Katarina Abrahamsson & Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist (case C-407/98) [2000] E.C.R. I-5539 
The Impact of EU Expansion on the Preliminary Rulings Procedure 
 
the Social Insurance Appeals Board (Luxembourg),26 the Competition Council (Finland),27 
the Special Commissioners of Income Tax (UK),28 the Person Appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor under s.76 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK),29 the Alien Appeals Board 
(Sweden),30 the Supreme Patent and Trade Mark adjudication body (Austria),31 and the 
Federal Communications Board (Austria).32 
 
More recently, however, there seems to be evidence of a shift in policy, with the ECJ 
tightening up its criteria; in particular, the Court has been paying very close attention to 
whether an alleged ‘court or tribunal’ satisfies the criterion of independence.33 Examples 
where a reference request was turned down on this ground include Pierre Corbiau (case C-
24/92),34 Walter Schmid (case C-516/99)35 and Syfait & Others v GlaxoSmithKline plc (case 
C-53/03).36 Cases where the reference request was admitted, but only after the referring 
body’s independence was closely examined, include Köllensperger & Atswanger (case C-
103/97)37 and Gabalfrisa (cases C-110 – 147/98).38 
 
Admittedly, there are early cases where the Court declined to respond to ruling requests, 
with perhaps the best known case being Nordsee (case 102/81),39 where an independent 
arbitrator was turned down.40 Similarly, a reference will be rejected if it is made by a body 
performing purely administrative functions, as in Victoria Film (case C-134/97).41 This is the 
case even if the body is actually designated under national law as a “court”, as in Job Centre 
(case C-111/94).42 Nevertheless, it is contended that these are relatively isolated examples, 
and that the Court’s policy on the Dorsch Consult criteria has hardened. 
 
4. The need for reform  
According to Hjalte Rasmussen:43 “It is… a generally shared view today that the case for a 
comprehensive and profound judicial reform has become compelling… the core need of 
                                                     
26
 Ghislain Leclere & Alina Deaconescu v Caisse nationale des prestations familiales (case C-43/99) 
[2001] E.C.R. I-4265 
27
 Korhonen & Others (case C-18/01) [2003] E.C.R. I-5321 
28
  Cadbury Schweppes plc v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue (case C-196/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-
7995 
29
 Elizabeth Florence Emanuel v Continental Shelf 128 Ltd (case C-259/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3089 
30
 Yunying Jia v Migrationsverket (case C-1/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-1 
31
 Armin Häupl v Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG (case C-246/05) [2007] E.C.R. I-4673 
32
 Österreichischer Rundfunk (case C-195/06) judgment 18th October 2007 
33
 See Catherine Barnard & Eleanor Sharpston, “The Changing Face of Article 177 References” 
(1997) 34 C.M.L. Rev. 1113, at pp. 1134 – 1135. 
34
 Pierre Corbiau v Administration des Contributions (case C-24/92) [1993] E.C.R. I-1277 
35
 [2002] E.C.R. I-4573 (Fifth Appeal Chamber of the regional finance authority for Vienna, 
Niederösterreich and Burgenland) 
36
 [2005] E.C.R. I-4609 (Greek Competition Commission). The case is discussed by Georgios 
Anagnostaras, “Preliminary problems and Jurisdiction Uncertainties: the Admissibility of Questions 
referred by Bodies Performing Quasi-judicial Functions” (2005) 30 E.L. Rev. 878 
37
 [1999] E.C.R. I-551 (Procurement Office of the Land of Tyrol, Austria) 
38
 Gabalfrisa SL & Others v Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (AEAT) [2000] E.C.R. I-1577 
(Regional Economic & Administrative Court, Catalonia) 
39
 Nordsee, Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland & Land Rheinland-
Pfalz [1973] 1511 
40
 See also Guy Denuit & Betty Cordenier v Transorient – Mosaïque Voyages et Culture SA (case C-
125/04) [2005] E.C.R. I-923, where a ruling requested by a body called “Arbitration Panel of the 
Travel Dispute Committee” in Belgium was refused 
41
 [1998] E.C.R. I-7023 
42
 [1995] E.C.R. I-3361; see also Doris Salzmann (case C-178/99) [2001] E.C.R. I-4421; Lutz GmbH 
& Others (case C-182/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-547; Standesamt Stadt Niebüll (case C-96/04) [2006] 
E.C.R. I-3561 
43
 “Remedying the Crumbling EC Judicial System” (2000) 37 C.M.L. Rev. 1071, at p.1072 
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reform grows out of the ever growing lengths of time spent by the Court of Justice in 
processing preliminary rulings”. He further contends that: “If profound reform of Article 234 is 
required because it offers the only viable remedy against the described malaise, then so be 
it”.44 
 
The question is, what form should this “profound reform” take?45 Reforms could be made 
either to the “supply” side – improving the ability of the European judicature to handle 
referrals, or to the “demand” side – restricting the flow of cases into the Court.46 The 
conferral of jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance (CFI) to handle some preliminary 
rulings under the Treaty of Nice is an example of a “supply” side reform. Other proposals 
which have been made on the “supply” side include introducing a form of case filtering or 
docket control; and a proposal to “decentralise” the preliminary rulings procedure to 
regionalised or national courts.  
 
On the demand side, proposals have been made to restrict to national courts of “last resort” 
only the right to seek references; to abolish the right of first-instance national courts to seek 
references; re-wording of Article 234 EC to remind national courts that they are “Community” 
/ “Union” courts and that, as such, it is their primary responsibility apply EU law and to further 
implore them not to seek rulings unless certain criteria are met, such as whether “reasonable 
doubt” exists; and scrapping mandatory referrals. Re-writing the CILFIT criteria under which 
national courts of “last resort” can decide not to seek references is another example of a 
demand side reform. 
 
In this context, two reform documents are of particular importance: The Future of the Judicial 
System of the European Union (Proposals and Reflections) paper, which was produced 
jointly by the ECJ and the CFI in May 1999;47 and The Report by the Working Party on the 
Future of the European Communities’ Court System, published in January 2000. This is a 
report by a body set up by the European Commission, under the chairmanship of Ole Due (a 
former judge and president of the ECJ).48 
 
 
4.1 “Supply” Side reforms 
 
Reform under the Treaty of Nice: Allowing the CFI to deal with references in “specific 
areas” 
As is well known, Article 225 (3) EC (post - Treaty of Nice 2001) provides that: 
 
The CFI shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling under Article 234, in specific areas laid down by the Statute. 
Where the CFI considers that the case requires a decision of principle likely to affect the 
unity or consistency of Community law, it may refer the case to the ECJ for a ruling. 
Decisions given by the CFI on questions referred for a preliminary ruling may exceptionally 
be subject to review by the ECJ, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the 
                                                     
44
 Op. cit., at p.1077 
45
 See generally Alan Dashwood & Angus Johnston (eds), “Synthesising the Debate” in “The Future of 
the Judicial System of the European Union” (Hart Publishing, 2001); Liz Heffernan, “The Community 
Courts post-Nice: a European Certiorari Revisited” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 907 
46
 See Takis Tridimas, “Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the 
Preliminary Reference Procedure” (2003) 40 C.M.L. Rev. 9, at pp.16 – 21 for a discussion of “supply 
and demand” in the context of the preliminary rulings procedure 
47
 Hereinafter “Proposals and Reflections”. Available at the following link: 
curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/autrestxts/ave.pdf 
48
 Hereinafter “Due”. Available at the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/pdf/due_en.pdf 
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Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Community law being 
affected. 
 
More than five years after the Treaty of Nice received its belated ratification, there are still no 
signs that this procedure is to be brought into operation. However, it is here submitted that it 
should be. Admittedly, there are bound to be teething problems, such as defining what is 
meant by ‘a decision of principle’ or exactly how ‘exceptional’ a question must be before the 
third subparagraph applies… but these will be resolved in time, if necessary by the ECJ 
itself. In much the same way that Article 234 EC has itself been the subject of a number of 
preliminary rulings, Article 225 (3) EC is part of the EC Treaty and hence susceptible to 
interpretation by the Court of Justice.  
 
A number of commentators have advocated that the CFI should be given its opportunity 
under Article 225 (3) EC. Bo Vesterdrof, for example, writes that:49 
 
“It is… very important that the Treaty of Nice now allows for a transfer of 
preliminary reference jurisdiction to the CFI… It will, in my personal opinion, at a 
point in time in the not too distant future become necessary to make use of this 
possibility. In fact, I am personally of the view that the sooner this possibility is 
exercised the better.” 
 
Takis Tridimas concurs, arguing that the reforms enacted by the Treaty of Nice “appear to 
establish an acceptable balance between competing demands… [they appear] preferable 
over alternative reforms”.50 This is not to suggest that the Nice reforms enjoyed unanimous 
support, however. Back in 1994, Anthony Arnull argued that preliminary rulings “should 
remain the exclusive preserve of the Court [of Justice]”,51 largely because of the problem of 
identifying which cases should be transferred.52 
 
Indeed, fourteen years, later the big question remains: which ‘specific areas’ ought to be 
transferred? Angus Johnston has suggested that “the obvious candidate” is EC-level 
intellectual property rights.53 Peter Dyrberg examines the possible future inter-relationship 
between the ECJ and CFI in some depth, and also offers a number of alternatives, including 
the aforementioned intellectual property rights, as well as, inter alia, competition law, the 
common agricultural policy, and social policy, without coming down in favour of any one in 
particular.54 Interestingly, in a footnote he suggests two areas as “suitable candidates for a 
transfer”, viz VAT cases and cases concerning the free movement of goods, on the basis 
that they are both “well developed areas of law with modest potential for [a] transcendent 
question to arise”.55 It is submitted that the free movement of goods would be perfect for a 
transfer to the CFI. The case law is certainly “well developed”, which is, of course, not the 
same thing as saying that it has no capacity for development,56 and would appear to fit in 
well alongside the CFI’s current portfolio of work. 
                                                     
49
 Bo Vesterdorf, “The Community Court System Ten Years from now and Beyond: Challenges and 
Possibilities” (2003) 28 E.L. Rev. 303, at p.314 
50
 “Knocking on Heaven’s Door…”, supra, at p.21 
51
 Anthony Arnull, “Refurbishing…”, supra, at p.309 
52
 Op. cit, at p.308. Arnull thought it “impractical” to transfer classes of cases because of the risk that 
the same case might raise different issues. 
53
 Angus Johnston, “Judicial Reform and the Treaty of Nice” (2001) 38 C.M.L. Rev. 499, at p.508 
54
 Peter Dyrberg, “What Should the Court of Justice be doing?” (2001) 26 E.L. Rev. 291, at p. 297 
55
 Loc cit. 
56
 Consider, for example, the recent cases of Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG 
(case C-244/06), judgment 14th February 2008 and Commission v Portugal (case C-265/06), 
judgment 10th April 2008. In the former case, the ECJ introduced the “protection of the child” as a 
possible justification for restricting the free movement of goods, whilst in the latter the Court 
introduced the “fight against crime” as another possibility. 




Other supply side reforms 
A brief overview will now be given of some of the other “supply side” reforms. 
 
“Case Filtering” / Docket Control 
In Proposals and Reflections it was suggested (somewhat hesitantly, it must be said) that 
the ECJ be allowed to select cases according to their “novelty, complexity or importance”.57 
This was rejected by Due,58 and academic commentators seem ambivalent at best.59 The 
arguments in favour are that it might prompt national courts to be more selective and would 
allows the ECJ to concentrate on those cases which are “fundamental” to the development 
of EU law. The arguments against are that it threatens uniformity, and could distort the 
judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national courts. The latter may not risk seeking a 
reference being rebuffed and therefore not send it. 
 
According to some commentators, however, the ECJ already employs an informal system of 
case filtering / docket control. Barnard and Sharpston noted a “change of approach” circa 
1990, with the Court imposing more stringent conditions on the admissibility of requests for 
preliminary rulings.60 Similarly, David O’Keeffe commented that “the case law on 
admissibility… could be seen as a form of docket control”,61 although he cautioned 
becoming too accepting of this “informal type of docket control” as to do so “could damage 
the horizontal nature of the co-operation between the national courts and the Court of 
Justice, replacing it with an hierarchical structure”.62 The position of the ECJ on the matter is 
summarised in Leur-Bloem (case C-28/95)63 and Butterfly Music (case C-60/98),64 where the 
Court acknowledged that it may refuse a request where it appears that the preliminary 
rulings procedure “has been misused and a ruling from the Court elicited by means of a 
contrived dispute”, where “it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought 
bears no relation to the actual facts of the main proceedings or their purpose”, or where the 
Court  “does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful 
answer to the questions submitted”. Tridimas, meanwhile, refers to the possibility for the ECJ 
to respond to a preliminary ruling request with an order, rather than a full judgment, as 
having “considerable potential to operate as a quasi-filtering mechanism”.65 
 
Decentralisation: create a series of regional courts specialising in EC law to handle 
preliminary rulings 
This was first proposed by Jean Paul Jacqué & Joseph Weiler:66 
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“At the apex of the system will remain the [ECJ], renamed perhaps as the European 
High Court of Justice… We propose the creation of four new Community Regional 
Courts which will have jurisdiction to receive preliminary references from, and issue 
preliminary rulings to, national courts within each region.”  
 
The authors proposed four regions, although that was linked to the fact that, in 1990, there 
were 12 Member States. With a 27 Member State Union in 2008, we might like to think about 
increasing the number of regions. To offset immediate arguments pertaining to the risk of 
inconsistency, they added that the Regional Courts would “clearly” be bound by decisions 
and rulings of the EHCJ and that in “most cases, one Regional Court will follow the 
jurisprudence of the others. If contradictory decisions or rulings are given, the appeal 
procedure should remedy this”. Furthermore: 67 
 
“The advantages we see are also quite transparent. If adopted, this system would 
ensure a dramatic decrease in the workload of the [ECJ], reserving its role as the 
ultimate guardian of the rule of law in the Community… Clearly this system would also 
bring about a substantial improvement in the time lag for preliminary rulings.” 
 
The proposal has support from Rasmussen, who described it as “an attractive solution”,68 
but not Arnull, who considered it “even less appealing” than a filtering system, on the basis 
that it “would present an almost insurmountable obstacle to the uniform application of the 
law”, to say nothing about the expense involved.69 Similarly, Proposals & Reflections 
showed (qualified) support for the idea,70 but it was rejected by Due.71 
 
4.2 “Demand” Side reforms 
 
Restrict to national courts of last resort only the right to seek references  
This is a suggestion which has recently been very strongly supported by Jan Komarek.72 He 
argued that the Court “must speak clearly and persuasively. This cannot be done if it 
pulverises its authority into hundreds of (sometimes) contradictory and (often) insufficiently 
reasoned answers”.73 The arguments in favour are that it would dramatically reduce the 
ECJ’s workload, perhaps by as much as 75%. It has also been argued that it is inappropriate 
for lower courts and tribunals in the national legal orders to be able to effectively by-pass the 
courts above it in the national hierarchy and approach the ECJ directly.74 The arguments 
against are that it threatens uniformity of EC law, threatens the dialogue that presently exists 
between ECJ and national courts, and could transfer problems to national systems, as 
parties would seek to keep appealing until they reached the national court of last resort.75 
Rasmussen has given his support to this proposal, describing it “eminently sensible”.76 
However, the majority of commentators are opposed, including O’Keeffe77 and Arnull,78 as 
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well as Proposals and Reflections79 and Due.80 It should also be pointed out that many 
important decisions have been made by the ECJ on a reference from fairly humble courts 
and tribunals. To take just one example, the landmark ruling in Baumbast & R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (case C-413/99),81 in which, inter alia, direct effect was 
conferred on Article 18 EC, was requested by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Finally, a 
modified version of this proposal – to abolish the right of first-instance national courts to seek 
references – was rejected by Due for the same reasons as above.82 
 
Abolish mandatory referrals 
It has been argued that the obligation on national courts of “last resort” to seek rulings could 
be abolished, effectively deleting Article 234 (3) EC. This has support amongst 
commentators, including Arnull, who pointed out that it “would send a powerful signal to the 
national courts that they were expected to play a greater role in the application of 
Community law in the Member States”,83 and (with some hesitancy) Vesterdorf.84 He argued 
that whilst “such an option certainly is thinkable, it is not without risks”, specifically, the risk of 
a body of case law building up in one or more Member States which is inconsistent with that 
of the ECJ and/or courts in other Member States, thereby threatening the uniformity of EU 
law and the smooth functioning of the internal market. To protect against this risk, he 
suggested that the Commission be given power to monitor the activity of national courts and, 
where it felt that a judgment “seriously threatens the unity or consistency” of EU law, 
“appeal” the case to the ECJ for a definitive ruling.85 
 
Abolish Preliminary Rulings 
Perhaps the ultimate solution to the preliminary rulings workload problem on the demand 
side was proposed by Philip Allott.86 His nuclear option is to abolish preliminary rulings, 
replacing them with a new system:87 
 
“Preliminary rulings would be replaced by a system (Community review / révision 
communautaire) under which it would be for national courts, which are also 
Union courts, to apply Community law fully and finally, as a normal source of law 
alongside other sources of law, subject to a power in the Commission, a Member 
State, or an interested party to seek a review by the Court of Justice of the 
application of Community law in particular legal proceedings, with the Court 
exercising a power, analogous to the US Supreme Court's certiorari procedure, 
to select only significant cases.”  
 
Water down the CILFIT criteria 
Lastly, consideration is given to the notion that the CILFIT criteria could be amended in 
some way, to relax their stringency. Under Article 234 (3) EC, Member States’ courts of “last 
resort” have an obligation to seek a preliminary ruling if one is ‘necessary’ to enable them to 
give judgment. In Intermodal Transports (case C-495/03),88 the Court stated that “supreme 
courts are bound by that obligation to refer as is any other national court or tribunal against 
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whose decisions there is no judicial remedy”.89 The purpose of Article 234 (3) EC was 
explained in Fazenda Pública (case C-393/98) as follows:90 
 
“[T]hat obligation to refer is based on cooperation, with a view to ensuring the 
proper application and uniform interpretation of Community law in all the Member 
States, between national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the 
application of Community law, and the Court of Justice… [It] is particularly 
designed to prevent a body of national case-law that is not in accordance with 
the rules of Community law from being established in any Member State.” 
 
However, according to the ECJ in CILFIT (case 283/81):91 
 
“[T]he correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope 
for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be 
resolved.”  
 
A decision not to request a preliminary ruling because the provision is “so obvious as to 
leave no scope for reasonable doubt” is widely referred to as acte clair. It is perceived in 
some quarters as being a dangerous strategy, open to abuse by national courts only too 
willing to decide not to trouble the Court of Justice. Arnull cites the case of Re Sandhu,92 in 
which the House of Lords declined to seek a preliminary ruling, despite being the UK’s court 
of “last resort”, using acte clair. Arnull comments that “there can be little doubt that the case 
should have been referred to the European Court… The CILFIT decision played an 
influential part in producing this wholly undesirable outcome”.93  
 
However, in CILFIT, the ECJ was well aware of the potential for abuse and purported to 
protect its acte clair doctrine with demanding safeguards. The Court issued very clear 
instructions that acte clair must be used with caution:94 
 
“Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court or tribunal 
must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member 
States and to the Court of Justice. Only if those conditions are satisfied, may the 
national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice 
and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it. However, the existence of such a 
possibility must be assessed on the basis of the characteristic features of Community 
law and the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise.” 
 
The Court continued:95 
 
“To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Community legislation is drafted in 
several languages and that different language versions are equally authentic. An 
interpretation of a provision of Community law thus involves a comparison of the 
different language versions.  
 
“It must also be borne in mind, even when the different language versions are entirely 
in accord with one another, that Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to 
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it. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that legal concepts do not necessarily have the 
same meaning in Community law and in the law of the various Member States.  
 
“Finally, every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being 
had to the objectives thereof and to the state of its evolution at the date on which the 
provision in question is to be applied.” 
 
CILFIT and acte clair only apply to questions of interpretation – it does not apply to questions 
raised by national courts pertaining to the validity of secondary legislation. In Gaston Schul 
(case C-461/03), the Court stated that CILFIT “cannot be extended to questions relating to 
the validity of Community acts”.96 The Court explained:97 
 
 “Firstly, even in cases which at first sight are similar, careful examination may 
show that a provision whose validity is in question is not comparable to a 
provision which has already been declared invalid because, for instance, it has a 
different legal or factual context, as the case may be. 
 
“The main purpose of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by Article 234 EC is 
to ensure that Community law is applied uniformly by national courts. That 
requirement of uniformity is particularly vital where the validity of a Community 
act is in question. Differences between courts of the Member States as to the 
validity of Community acts would be liable to jeopardise the essential unity of the 
Community legal order and undermine the fundamental requirement of legal 
certainty.” 
 
The CILFIT criteria (paragraphs 16 – 20) 
In paragraphs 16 – 20 of CILFIT, the Court laid down four criteria that should be satisfied 
before a national court or tribunal can decide to refrain from seeking a preliminary ruling 
under Article 234 EC (3) using acte clair. 
 
Criterion One: Equally obvious to the courts of the “other” Member States 
The first criterion is that the national court “must be convinced that the matter is equally 
obvious to the courts of the other Member States”98 as well as to the Court of Justice. In 
1982, with an EEC membership of 10 States, there were nine “other” Member States; in 
2008, with EU membership now standing at 27 Member States, there are 26 “others”. As the 
EU looks to expand into the western Balkans and beyond, with the three official candidate 
States being Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey,99 that is set to 
rise to 29 “other” States. The European Commission website lists five “potential” candidate 
states: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.100 Should these 
all accede then the number of “other” Member States rises to 34. 
 
In Intermodal Transports (case C-495/03), the Court simultaneously endorsed, and refused 
to extend the scope of, the first criterion. The Court stated that:101 
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“[B]efore the national court or tribunal comes to the conclusion that the correct 
application of a provision of Community law is so obvious that there is no scope 
for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be 
resolved and therefore refrains from submitting a question to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling, it must in particular be convinced that the matter is equally 
obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. On 
the other hand, such a court cannot be required to ensure that, in addition, the 
matter is equally obvious to bodies of a non-judicial nature such as 
administrative authorities.” 
 
Criterion Two: “Authentic” Languages 
The second criterion states that courts and tribunals must bear in mind that Community 
legislation is “drafted in several languages”, each one of which is “equally authentic”. In 
1982, Community legislation was drafted in seven languages: Danish, Dutch, English, 
French, German, Greek and Italian. There are now 22: Portuguese and Spanish (added in 
1986); Finnish and Swedish (added in 1995); Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak, Slovene (added in 2004) and Bulgarian and Romanian 
(added in 2007). In addition, for preliminary rulings involving primary legislation, Irish should 
be added, bringing the grand total to 23 “equally authentic” languages that “must be borne in 
mind” when a national court or tribunal is considering acte clair.102 This is set to rise to 26, 
with the addition of three new languages: Croatian, Macedonian and Turkish. If all of the 
“potential” candidate states were to accede then that would rise to 30, with the addition of 
Albanian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian. 
 
A recent case before the Court of First Instance illustrates the difficulties posed. In 
Commission v Germany (case T-374/04),103 the CFI was required to give an interpretation of 
the phrase ‘intended to be allocated’ in Directive 2003/87. The Court confirmed that “an 
interpretation of a provision of Community law… involves a comparison of the different 
language versions” before giving a careful examination of the Danish, Dutch, English, 
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish versions,104 concluding 
that “significant nuances exist between the various language versions”.105 
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Criterion Three: Community law and its peculiar “Terminology” “Legal concepts” 
As with the second criterion, this is something which national courts and tribunals must “bear 
in mind”. 
 
Criterion Four: Teleological approach to interpretation 
According to the ECJ in CILFIT, this is something which “must be emphasised”. 
 
 
Are the criteria too strict? 
Academic reaction to CILFIT over the years has been mixed. The consensus seems to be 
that the ECJ in CILFIT was right to endorse acte clair. However, opinion is divided about the 
four criteria to be satisfied by national courts before invoking the doctrine. In particular, 
criteria one and two appear to be very strict. Referring to criterion one, Peter Wattel asks, 
rhetorically, “For which Finnish judge is it obvious what his Portuguese or Greek colleague 
would consider obvious, or vice versa?”106 
 
Hjalte Rasmussen is perhaps the most highly critical of the CILFIT criteria. While he 
endorses the ECJ’s decision to allow national courts to decide questions of EU law for 
themselves, he believes that the CILFIT criteria are so stringent that, taken as a whole, the 
judgment achieves the opposite of what the Court said it intended to do. Writing in 1984, he 
argued that CILFIT “means something very different from what it prima facie establishes… 
The real strategy is different from the apparent strategy. The real strategy… is not to 
incorporate an acte clair concept [but] to call the national judiciaries to circumspection when 
they are faced with problems of interpretation and application of Community law”.107 
Returning to the same theme in 2000, he argued that the ECJ’s workload problems were 
“self-inflicted… I refer to the submission straightjacket designed by the Court in CILFIT. This 
judgment has functioned as a magnet, drawing numerous, and often less-than-necessary, 
cases up to the Court”.108 
 
Mancini and Keeling observed that Rasmussen’s analysis was “correct”, whilst endorsing his 
view that the CILFIT criteria narrow the availability of acte clair. They argued that the CILFIT 
criteria – which they referred to as “stringent conditions” – restricted the “circumstances in 
which the clarity of the provision may legitimately be sustained to cases so rare that the 
nucleus of its own authority is preserved intact”.109 More recently, Paul Craig and Gráinne de 
Búrca supported the views above by stating that the Court of Justice had placed “significant 
constraints” on the exercise of acte clair “in the hope that national courts would play the 
game and refuse to refer only when matters really were unequivocally clear”.110  
 
However, Anthony Arnull took a different, more optimistic, perspective. Writing in 1989, he 
suggested that the “overall effect” of CILFIT was to “enable national judges to justify any 
reluctance they might feel to ask for a preliminary ruling [and] to encourage national courts to 
decide points of Community law for themselves.”111 Referring to the CILFIT criteria, he 
argued that “only the requirement that the different language versions be compared… had 
any teeth”.112 
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This was not, in fact, the first time Arnull had made the point that only the second criterion 
had “any teeth”.113 However, in that earlier article in 1985, Arnull actually re-phrased the first 
criterion, stating that the national court “had to be satisfied that the meaning of the provision 
in question would be equally obvious to the European Court and to courts in the other 
Member States”.114 The reader is reminded that what the Court actually said in CILFIT, and 
repeated in Intermodal Transports, is that national courts of last resort “must be convinced”, 
not just “satisfied”, about the attitudes of all the other courts. It is submitted, however, that 
there is a world of difference between the two: being convinced about something is one 
thing; being satisfied about something is very different. It will be further submitted, moreover, 
that the first CILFIT criterion should indeed be changed to what Arnull claimed that it said. 
 
It is contended here that the CILFIT criteria, when laid down in the autumn of 1982, were 
very difficult to satisfy – and that the ECJ intended exactly that: for them to be very difficult 
(but not impossible) to satisfy. However, now, in the summer of 2008, those same criteria 
have become practically impossible to satisfy.115 With respect, how exactly is a national 
court in one Member State to be “convinced” that the courts in all 26 “other” States would 
find the answer to a question “equally obvious”? It almost certainly cannot be done. What 
probably happens is that national court judges either default to Arnull’s test of being 
“satisfied” or, worse, simply ignore the first criterion altogether. And if the first criterion is 
being ignored, what about the others? Are they being ignored too?  
 
A striking British example of acte clair being invoked – but the CILFIT criteria being ignored – 
is R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte ITF Ltd.116 Here, the House of Lords failed to 
invoke the preliminary rulings procedure, despite the fact that the case raised a number of 
interesting interpretational issues involving the present Articles 29 and 30 EC – the word 
‘measures’ and the phrase ‘public policy’. The House was prepared to assume that the Chief 
Constable’s decisions that prompted the litigation were not ‘measures’ but that, even if they 
were, the ‘public policy’ derogation applied. Lord Cooke of Thorndon, for example, observed 
somewhat languidly that “Of course, it is possible that in [Article 29 EC] ‘measures’ has 
some special and more limited meaning… I am content now to assume, however, that what I 
have called the ordinary meaning is the correct one.”117 
 
The CILFIT criteria were completely ignored. It is submitted that, had they been used, a 
preliminary reference would have been inevitable, at least on the ‘public policy’ point. After 
all, never mind whether the courts in the other Member States would all agree, even the 
courts in England could not agree with each other.118 Academic reaction to the ITF case 
was, rightly, hostile. Estella Baker commented that ITF was “far from an exemplary 
illustration of the courts discharging their duty to apply Community law. Although it is 
probable that the end result is the correct one, it is impossible to be certain. At least three 
moot points lie buried in the case… there is a persuasive argument that a reference should 
have been made”.119 Similarly, Erica Szyszczak noted that the appeal to the House of Lords 
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“required the interpretation of a number of Community law concepts… It is surprising that the 
House of Lords did not make an Article 234 reference”.120  
 
It may not be stretching a point to suggest that, were such a judgment to be given now, the 
House could find itself the subject of a state liability claim from the disappointed applicants, 
following the landmark ECJ judgment in Köbler v Austria (case C-224/01).121 Peter Wattel 
makes the point that the combination of CILFIT and Köbler “leads to a conclusion that if a 
national highest court wants to avid the real risk of making its government liable, it had better 
ask for a preliminary rulings in basically every case involving a question of EC law possibly 
conferring rights of individuals which has not yet been addressed by the ECJ”.122 
 
Should the Criteria be relaxed? 
Rasmussen clearly thinks so. He has argued, persuasively it is submitted, that CILFIT will 
continue to “function as a magnet”, unless it is overruled, or at least re-written. He has called 
for the Court “to rewrite CILFIT’s submission criteria, thereby watering down some of the 
stringency of the conditions”.123 In Wiener (case C-338/95),124 Advocate General Jacobs 
also made the case for relaxing the CILFIT criteria.125 He pointed out that “it is necessary to 
interpret [Article 234 EC], like all other general provisions of Community law and in particular 
the provisions of the Treaty, in an evolutionary way”.126 He continued:127 
 
“Returning therefore to the CILFIT conditions, I would suggest that they do not 
need to be reconsidered (except perhaps on one point) but that they should 
apply only in cases where a reference is truly appropriate to achieve the 
objectives of [Article 234 EC], namely when there is a general question and 
where there is a genuine need for uniform interpretation. 
 
“The one point on which the CILFIT conditions might in my view be reconsidered 
or refined is the statement that “an interpretation of a provision of Community law 
… involves a comparison of the different language versions”. Although the Court 
preceded that statement by pointing out that “the different language versions are 
all equally authentic”, I do not think that the CILFIT judgment should be regarded 
as requiring the national courts to examine any Community measure in every 
one of the official Community languages (now numbering 11 – or 12, if the 
Treaties and certain other basic texts are in issue). That would involve in many 
cases a disproportionate effort on the part of the national courts; moreover, 
reference to all the language versions of Community provisions is a method 
which appears rarely to be applied by the Court of Justice itself, although it is far 
better placed to do so than the national courts. In fact the very existence of many 
language versions is a further reason for not adopting an excessively literal 
approach to the interpretation of Community provisions, and for putting greater 
                                                     
120
 Erica Szyszczak, “Fundamental Values in the House of Lords” (2000) 25 E.L. Rev. 443, at pp. 445, 
446 
121
 [2003] ECR I-10239, in which the Court declared that the “principle that Member States are obliged 
to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are 
responsible is also applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court 
adjudicating at last instance”, at paragraph 59. See also Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Italy (case 
C-173/03) [2006] ECR I-5177, at paragraph 30 
122
 Peter Wattel, “Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove…”, supra, at p.178 
123
 Rasmussen, “Remedying…”, supra, at p.1082. Due, supra, at p.15 also considered the possibility 
of re-writing the CILFIT criteria, but rather disappointingly simply stated that “it will be for the Court of 
Justice to determine whether or not it needs to be made more flexible” 
124
 Wiener SI GmbH v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1997] ECR I-6495 
125
 [1997] E.C.R. I-6495; [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 1110 
126
 Ibid at paragraph 59 
127
 Ibid at paragraphs 64 and 65 
The Impact of EU Expansion on the Preliminary Rulings Procedure 
 
weight on the context and general scheme of the provisions and on their object 
and purpose. The reference in the CILFIT judgment would be better regarded, in 
my view, as an essential caution against taking too literal an approach to the 
interpretation of Community provisions and as reinforcing the point that they 
must be interpreted in the light of their context and of their purposes as stated in 
the preamble rather than on the basis of the text alone. The text can be 
particularly misleading in the case of technical legal terms, which, as the Court 
goes on to point out, may not have the same meaning in Community law as they 
have in the legal systems of the Member States.” 
 
Rasmussen unsurprisingly agrees, noting that AG Jacobs “should be praised for taking in 
this case the initiative to officially open the necessary reconsidering of the wisdom of 
CILFIT”.128 He goes on to suggest that a “CILFIT II” should be drafted:129 
 
“The thrust of a CILFIT II should be to give the initiative back to the judges of the 
Member States, trusting them to solve on their own far more questions of 
interpretation… The job to pin down on paper the demarcation line between 
those cases which will deserve EC judicial attention in the future and those 
classes of cases which the national judges ought to decide on their own 
responsibility will not be easy, but it is as indispensible as difficult.” 
 
So how should CILFIT II be worded? 
Paragraph 16 of CILFIT is the logical starting point for a CILFIT II. In other words, where 
there is no reasonable doubt, acte clair applies. To redefine the criteria, it is submitted that 
Arnull’s rephrasing of the first CILFIT criterion and AG Jacobs’ suggestions regarding the 
second CILFIT criterion should be adopted. Criteria three and four can be retained intact. 
The following is therefore suggested as a possible CILFIT II: 
 
1. The correct application of EU law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved.  
2. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court or 
tribunal must be satisfied that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the 
other Member States and to the Court of Justice.  
3. It must be borne in mind that Community legislation is drafted in several 
languages and that different language versions are equally authentic. The 
national court or tribunal is not, however, required to examine any given measure 
in every one of the official languages of the Union. 
4. It must also be borne in mind, even when the different language versions are 
entirely in accord with one another, that EU law uses terminology which is 
peculiar to it. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that legal concepts do not 
necessarily have the same meaning in EU law and in the law of the various 
Member States. 
5. Finally, every provision of EU law must be placed in its context and interpreted in 
the light of the provisions of EU law as a whole, regard being had to the 
objectives thereof and to the state of its evolution at the date on which the 
provision in question is to be applied. 
 
We therefore arrive at a compromise solution: a set of criteria which are “stringent” but not 
“excessively” so; which are more likely to be accepted as such and applied more 
conscientiously by national courts, rather than treated as wholly unrealistic and simply 
ignored. With a CILFIT II, Rasmussen’s “magnet” might lose some of its pulling power. 
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Conclusion 
As the EU expands, the preliminary rulings procedure will come under further strain. 
Numerous reform proposals have been advocated over the last quarter century, but two are 
endorsed here. The CFI should be entrusted to handle preliminary rulings concerning the 
free movement of goods; and the notoriously stringent CILFIT criteria should be relaxed. 
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